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Abstract 
Is Privatization Enough? Finding Performance 
Breaks for UK Power Plants 
EPRG Working Paper    1021 
Cambridge Working Paper in Economics  1043 
Thomas P. Triebs and Michael G. Pollitt   
 
The literature shows that for most UK industries privatization might be 
necessary but is not sufficient to produce economic benefits. Often prior 
changes in management or later changes in market structure and 
regulation have larger impacts than privatization itself. We ask what 
changes around privatization had the greatest impact on efficiency for 
UK electricity generators. We analyse the effects of privatization and 
other changes in incentives on plant efficiency using a newly compiled 
unbalanced panel of about 60 plants for the years 1980 to 2004. We 
measure efficiency as input demands for two standard inputs, fuel and 
labour as well as three air emissions, CO2, SO2, and NOx. We model 
the change in efficiency as a single intercept break and allow for the 
break to occur at an unknown date. Inference for breaks and break 
dates relies on Quandt-Andrews type tests. We find breaks associated 
with efficiency increases for fuel and labour. Breaks and efficiency 
changes for the three emissions are generally related to fuel efficiency 
though there are instances where efficiencies move in opposite 
directions suggesting trade-off between fuel efficiency and emissions 
exist. There are no breaks prior to privatization. All breaks occur after 
privatization. Efficiency increases first for labour and later for fuel. We 
conclude that electricity privatization like other UK privatizations was a 
unique event. Privatization was important to prepare the ground but it 
seems that only the subsequent restructuring of the industry, the 
reduction of political interference in fuel choice, and 
investment in new and more efficient generation 
technologies increased efficiency. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and research question 
The privatisation wave of the 1980s and 1990s was influenced by theoretical 
predictions of lower prices and lower costs (Winston, 1993). However, both 
theorists and practitioners often underestimated the amount of detailed design 
that is necessary to establish functioning markets. 
 
The privatisation of the electricity industry needs particular care because its 
service is essential and the economics of supply do not necessarily square with 
the physics of supply. Often the failure to design markets properly brought into 
disrepute the entire reform agenda (of which privatisation was often a key part) 
as for instance after the electricity crisis in California. In the UK restructuring 
and privatization (R&P) of the electricity supply industry (ESI) was followed by 
about ten years of trial and error until a reasonably competitive market without 
retail regulation emerged. Our research question is how and when did these 
trials affect plant-level technical operating efficiency? This allows us to test the 
assertion of agency theory that management is “effort-averse” (Fabrizio et al., 
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2007) and that it is private ownership combined with market rivalry that push 
management to live up to its potential. Unlike the work of Newbery and Pollitt 
(1997) or Fabrizio et al. (2007) we do not only ask how much was the impact, 
but also when did it happen? 
 
We study the development of productive efficiency for a sample of UK electricity 
generation plants from before privatization in 1985 until 2002 and map the 
result to the institutional changes during this period to assess their relative 
importance. Unlike Newbery and Pollitt (1997) we are not concerned with the 
overall costs and benefits of privatization but the impact on plant-level operating 
efficiency as a proxy for management performance. The effect of institutional 
change on operating efficiency can only be disentangled at the plant level 
because other factors like fuel mix cannot be controlled for at a higher level of 
analysis. Also the contribution of plant-level efficiency gains to the overall 
benefits from privatization of the UK electricity supply industry (ESI) is large 
(Newbery and Pollitt, 1997). To our best knowledge this is the first study that 
takes this perspective on the privatization of the UK ESI. 3 
 
We model plant-level efficiency as individual input demand functions derived 
from cost-minimization based on a model introduced by Fabrizio et al. (2007). 
We extend their model by including three major air emissions as non-traditional 
inputs (as opposed to traditional inputs, e.g.: fuel and labour). Also, the 
counterfactual is not the performance of a control group but the plant’s own past 
performance. More precisely we search for one known or unknown structural 
break in each demand equation using Quandt-Andrews type test statistics 
(Hansen, 2001). Unlike most other privatization studies we search for a break in 
the data and then map it to the known event history (Freeman, 2005). One 
exception is Waddams Price and Weyman-Jones (1996) who use a Quandt-test to 
search for a break in productivity around the privatization of British Gas. Unlike 
most other studies of UK privatizations we do not rely on measures of labour or 
total factor productivity (Pollitt, 2000, p. 130) but input demands. We have 
compiled a new unbalanced plant-level panel data set which covers about ten 
years before and after privatization. We find efficiency improvements for all 
inputs. Almost all breaks occur several years after privatization. We conclude 
that though privatization might have been important to prepare the ground it 
seems that only the subsequent restructuring of the industry, the reduction of 
political interference in fuel choice, the entry of more efficient generators, and 
the change of the wholesale trading regime increased efficiency. 
 
The outline is as follows. Section 2 provides some background information on UK 
electricity privatization as well as emissions and environmental regulation. 
Section 3 summarizes both the relevant theoretical and empirical literature. 
Section 4 states our hypotheses and section 5 describes our approach and 
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empirical model. Section 6 describes the data. Section 7 gives the results which 
are then discussed in section 8. 
 
 
2 Background 
2.1 UK electricity restructuring 
This section describes the circumstances of privatization and outlines the most 
important events during the following decade. What stands out about the 
privatization of electricity is that even though it was among the last major 
privatizations in the UK it was the first that was accompanied by an immediate 
restructuring of the industry (Newbery, 2004, p. 2). Previously, most firms (e.g. 
British Telecom and British Gas) had been privatized as de facto monopolies. 
Nevertheless, as the objectives of privatization were largely political rather than 
economic, effective competition was sacrificed to obtain the political support for 
privatization (Kay and Thompson, 1986, p. 31). Margaret Thatcher herself 
summarized her reform agenda by saying: “Economics are the method; the 
object is to change the heart and soul.”4 It seems that for electricity privatization 
the hearts and souls of shareholders (including the government) and miners 
were more important than the hearts and souls of customers. Accordingly, 
efficiency gains from privatization were not high on the political agenda as 
opposed to a number of other economic and political objectives (e.g. lessening of 
union power and widening share ownership) as detailed by Green and Haskel 
(2004, p. 65). But was there room for efficiency improvements? According to 
Henney (1987, p. 7) political interference was pervasive in the Central Electricity 
Generation Board (CEGB) and there were various managerial inefficiencies (pp. 
38). Pollitt (2000, p. 109) argues that there was “a lot of potential for increased 
productivity especially if US-style management techniques could be introduced”. 
Newbery (1998, p. 5) on the other hand, claims that the CEGB was “moderately 
well operated”. Cragg and Dyck (1999) argue that privatizations in the UK 
brought little change in governance relationships and that golden shares and 
dispersed ownership weakened control after privatization. However, they find 
that across all UK privatizations life became less quiet for managers several 
years after privatization. Though it seems that there was potential for efficiency 
improvements after privatization it is unlikely that this potential was realized 
early on. 
 
Next we give a short chronological account of events. Before privatization 
electricity was supplied by the CEGB, a vertically integrated state-owned 
monopoly. As early as 1983 a new Energy Act required the regional distribution 
franchises (the Area Boards) to buy energy from independents at avoided cost. 
But for various reasons this first attempt to liberalize had no lasting effect 
(Henney, 1994, p. 20). It is likely that a year-long miner’s strike in 1984-5 made 
the government only more determined to privatize the industry. Eventually in 
1990 the UK government restructured and privatized the CEGB. The industry 
was vertically unbundled and horizontally separated. Assets were split among 
four companies: all thermal plants were divided between PowerGen and 
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National Power, the new transmission company National Grid obtained pumped 
storage plants, and Nuclear Electric the nuclear plants. Sixty percent of 
PowerGen and National Power were sold to the public in 1991. The remaining 
shares were sold in February 1995. Nuclear Electric was only privatized in 1996 
and is not included in this study. Unlike the wires businesses of transmission and 
distribution, generation and supply were considered potentially competitive and 
entry allowed. In Northern Ireland and Scotland the electricity industries were 
restructured and privatised in 1991 and 1992 respectively. Pollitt (1997) 
discusses the case of Northern Ireland. Northern Irish and Scottish generators 
are included in this study. 
 
After privatization a wholesale trading regime had to be established. The first 
trading arrangement was referred to as the Pool. Both the number of players and 
the behaviour of the Pool participants led to concerns over market power and 
eventually the forced divestiture of the two incumbents, National Power and 
PowerGen in 1996.5 In subsequent years the two incumbents sold more 
generation capacity (mostly to US investors) in return for regulatory permission 
to re-integrate with the regional distribution companies. The overall result was 
that market concentration for generation decreased considerably between 1996 
and 1999. The Herfindahl Hirschman index, a measure of market concentration, 
for coal fired plant had dropped by 1999 to a fifth of its value in 1990. 
 
The entry of US firms also seems to have ended tacit collusion between the 
generators. Edison Mission bought two plants in 1999 and increased output by 
30% (Newbery, 2004, p. 18). In order to improve competition further the Pool 
was abolished in favour of bilateral trading in 2001 (referred to as New 
Electricity Trading Arrangements – NETA). Ofgem (2002, p. 1) judged that in the 
Pool “prices had failed to properly reflect a more competitive generation market 
and falling generation input costs”. Newbery (2004) however doubts the 
effectiveness of NETA and credits the increase in competition that occurred just 
before for lower prices. The introduction of NETA is the last major event our 
analysis covers. 
 
Though generation was market-driven after privatization, the overall fuel mix 
was not free from political interference. Figure 1 illustrates the change in the fuel 
mix in the period 1970 to 2005. From privatization until late 1992 and to a lesser 
degree till 1998 the incumbent generators were committed to buying certain 
amounts of British coal at above world market prices which could be passed on 
to captive residential customers (Newbery, 1998). It was intended to let these 
coal contracts expire when retail competition for all customers was introduced 
in 1998. At privatization only sites with loads above 1 MW were allowed to buy 
directly from the Pool and this threshold was lowered to 100 kW in 1994. 
Starting in about 1993 gas was increasingly substituted for coal (the “dash for 
gas”) 6. Nevertheless, in the late 1990s concerns over dwindling British coal sales 
                                                 
5 In 1996 National Power and Powergen leased a total of 6 GW to Eastern Group (Electricity 
Association, 1997). 
6 The move to gas was not widely anticipated as the use of gas as a generation fuel was prohibited 
till 1988. 
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and the dependence on gas lead to a moratorium on new gas-fired generation 
and a visible increase in coal burn.7 
 
Low capital cost and low gas prices made gas the fuel of choice for new entrants. 
Nevertheless, the majority of new CCGT plants were built by the two incumbents 
because they could off-set a high gas price against the cost of retrofitting sulphur 
abatement technology to their existing coal plants (Bantock and Longhurst, 
1995, p. 135). As new gas capacity grew much faster than demand many coal-
fired plants were closed prematurely. Also, the regulator, Offer (1992, p. 15) 
states: “During the 1980’s the CEGB compared the cost of transmission 
reinforcement with the running and maintenance cost of these smaller and older 
stations (i.e. less efficient plants) and concluded that the most cost effective way 
of supporting the local group demand was to rely on their continued operation.” 
It is possible that had the industry not been restructured different trade-offs 
between transmission and generation would have been made and various 
stations would have continued operation. Last, the substitution of oil for coal 
during the miner’s strike in 1984 is visible in the data. Overall demand has been 
trending upwards since the early 1980s. 
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7 Fowlie (1999, p. 30) reminds us that the British experience might be rather unique. She states 
that in the US “increased liberalization of markets through the implementation of Order 888 […] 
meant […] older, under-utilized coal plants are being brought back into production”. 
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We summarize this section by defining three post-privatization periods. First, 
there is the period 1990 to 1994 when privatization takes place and the two 
incumbents form an effective duopoly. Then there is the period 1995-1998 when 
the industry is fully privatized, restructured further, and more retail competition 
allowed. The last period between 1999 and 2002 (the last year in which we allow 
a break to occur) is characterized by much stronger competition because of 
further entry and the full opening of the retail market. In the remainder of this 
paper we will refer to these periods as privatization, restructuring, and 
competition. But this distinction is more relevant for fuel and labour than for 
emissions which we discuss next. 
 
 
2.2 Emissions and environmental regulation 
We argued above that economic efficiency was not the prime objective of 
privatization. This is even truer for environmental efficiency. Pearson (2000, p. 
291) states: “Environmental policy considerations do not appear to have formed 
any significant part of the objectives that underlay privatization […]”. 
Nevertheless, privatization unintentionally had an effect on industry emissions 
through changes in fuel mix and improvements in general efficiency. 
Additionally, privatization had an effect on the type of abatement technology 
installed in response to environmental regulation. Adrain and Housley (1999, p. 
43) conclude that “despite the lack of a premium for environmental investments, 
fierce competition and the adoption of forward-looking policies have resulted in 
major environmental benefits”. 
 
Most UK environmental regulation is derived from national commitments under 
international agreements to reduce the amount of certain emissions by a certain 
percentage over a certain period. Many regulations stipulate different sets of 
rules for existing plant and new build respectively. We focus on three emissions: 
carbon dioxide (CO2), sulphur dioxide (SO2), and nitrogen oxides (NOx) which 
we label non-traditional inputs.  
Table 1 lists agreements and regulations that address these three emissions. It is 
helpful to distinguish between SO2 and NOx on the one hand and CO2 on the 
other. Whereas the first two were targeted by international agreements already 
in the mid 1980s CO2 was targeted by the Kyoto protocol and in particular the 
start of the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) in 2005. Thus, there 
has been no effective CO2 limit over our sample period. In 1990 the 
Environmental Protection Act introduced both plant and firm-level SO2 emission 
limits for coal and oil fired plant (gas emits no SO2). These limits have been 
tightened over time. 
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Table 1: Relevant Environmental Regulation for UK Power Plants 
Date Regulation Coverage Content 
1988 
(implemented 
by the 
Environmental 
Protection Act 
1990) 
 
Large Combustion Plant 
Directive (LCPD) 
NOx, SO2, dust from 
plants with rated 
thermal input > 50 
MW 
requires the industry to 
reduce emissions in steps 
for existing plant (SO2: 
10% by 1993, 40% by 
1998 and 60% by 2003 
compared with 1980; 
NOx: 16% by 1993 and 
31% by 1998 compared to 
1980), emissions limits 
for new plant 
1994 International Protocol 
on Sulphur Dioxide 
SO2 80% national reduction 
by 2010 (based on 1980) 
1999 Gothenburg Protocol
8
 Sulphur, NOx, VOCs 
and ammonia 
SO2: national reduction 
by 87% for 1980-2010, 
(NOx 54%), requirement 
of BAT  
2000 Utilities Act Energy suppliers obligation for renewables 
and energy efficiency 
2000 Kyoto/ additional UK 
targets 
CO2 and other 
greenhouse gases 
20% national reduction 
of 1990 levels by 2008/12 
2005 EU ETS CO2 and other 
greenhouse gases 
Plant level cap and trade 
2008 revised LCPD effective NOx, SO2, dust from 
plants with rated 
thermal input > 50 
MW 
Opt-out possibility
9
 
2008 Climate Change Act CO2 and other 
greenhouse gases 
80% national reduction 
of 1990 levels by 2050 
 
 
Generally, there are three ways to abate at a given plant (while operating): change 
fuel, install abatement technology, or increase efficiency. Changing fuel implies using 
the same fuel but of a different quality which typically means lower contents of 
sulphur or nitrogen. For instance, foreign coal tends to contain less sulphur than 
British coal and is often cheaper. Though it might be possible to change fuel type at 
the plant level as well this is typically not done because plants are optimized for a 
particular fuel. Different fuels contain different amounts of energy as well as different 
amounts of emissions (see Table 2).
10
 According to the DTI (1998) the reduction in 
CO2 for the industry between 1990 and 1997 is two thirds due to fuel switching with 
the remainder due to increases in efficiency. 
 
                                                 
8 See http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/multi_h1.htm. 
9
 The LCPD allows plants to opt-out given that they do not operate for more than 20,000 hours 
during the years 2008-2015 and cease operating in 2015 the latest. Plants opting out are all 
major coal plants not fitted with FGD: Cockenzie, Didcot A, Fawley, Ferrybridge (part), Grain, 
Littlebrook, Ironbridge, Kingsnorth, and Tilbury according to DTI (2006). 
10 Two important points are that different types of coal (i.e. hard coal and lignite) have different 
sulphur contents and as natural gas has its hydrogen sulphide content removed before 
distribution its sulphur dioxide emissions are negligible. 
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Table 2: Emission Factors 
 
      
Emission Emission factors (grams/GJ) 
 
Natural gas Oil Coal 
CO2 (weight of C) 14000 19000 25000 
SO2 0 520 850 
NOx 51 120 270 
source: Pearson (2000, Table 21.4) 
   
Various technological changes can be made at the combustion and post-
combustion stages. At the combustion stage low NOx or sulphur burners can be 
retrofitted. Though for NOx (and particular gas-fired stations) these decrease 
thermal efficiency as they dial down the combustion temperature to reduce the 
nitrogen intake from the air (Martin et al., 2007). In the early 1990s National 
Power and Powergen retrofitted low NOx burners as originally planned by the 
CEGB. Most new CCGT plants also featured NOx control technology. According to 
Canning et al. (1999) this retrofit reduced NOx levels “upwards of 30%”. The 
most prominent example of post-combustion abatement is Flue Gas 
Desulphurization (FGD) equipment which has been installed at several plants 
throughout the 1990s to cut SO2 emissions which are responsible for acid rain. 
The program was initiated by the CEGB in 1986 on a “voluntary” basis. Actually, 
privatization led to a reduction in the number of plants  that were fitted with FGD 
according to Reid and Longhurst (1990, p. 177). 
 
A third source of emission reductions – and the focus of our analysis - is the 
increase in thermal efficiency (which in turn might be affected by fuel type and 
abatement technology). An increase in thermal efficiency will mostly be 
accompanied by an increase in environmental efficiency; NOx being the 
exemption. After privatization generators had strong incentives to improve 
commercial performance and thus increase thermal efficiency. However, it is less 
clear what the incentives for improved environmental performance were at the 
plant level beyond emission limits and increases in thermal efficiency. Newbery 
(1995) provides some anecdotal evidence for incentives to increase 
environmental performance. He reports from a station visit that “environmental 
training [is] extensive and written into contracts for performance related pay”. 
Nevertheless, when making abatement decisions management might face trade-
offs. For instance, though fitting a plant with FGD typically reduces emissions of 
SO2 by 90-95% the operation of FGD reduces thermal efficiency and thus 
increases fuel input and CO2 “input” as mentioned by Barrett and Protheroe 
(1995). Newbery (1995) notes that FGD can be bypassed, though emissions 
might be monitored. It is not clear what are the incentives to operate FGDs as 
their operation increases costs and might put plants at a competitive 
disadvantage (Newbery, 1995). Interestingly both the rise of CCGTs and the 
installation of FGDs might have increased emissions at other plants to the extent 
that regulatory constraints applied at the firm or industry level. 
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According to Adrain and Housley (1999) the industry outperformed its targets 
for SO2 and NOx emission by 32 percent in 1995. Also, the Electricity Association 
(1991) states that “the current programme of retrofitting coal-fired plant with 
low NOx burners will allow generators to meet the NOx emissions targets”. It 
seems that the “dash for gas” and the selective installation of abatement 
equipment were sufficient to fulfil (and surpass) existing environmental 
regulations which reduced the incentive to limit emissions at the plant level 
further. 
 
We conclude the following. All three emissions were reduced substantially 
during the 1990s where switching fuel at the industry level from coal to gas had 
the biggest impact. For NOx and SO2 the installation of abatement technologies 
at individual plants had an additional effect. Also, the substitution of foreign for 
domestic coal might have had an impact on SO2. Last, increasing competition led 
to an increase in thermal efficiency and thereby lower emissions. But unlike 
changes in the incentives for the use of traditional (and costly) inputs it is less 
obvious how privatization changed incentives for emissions reductions at the 
plant level beyond regulatory constraints. Therefore it is more difficult to 
distinguish different periods as in the previous section. We distinguish the 
periods before and after CCGT generation took off in 1994. Also around 1994 
obligations to burn high-sulphur British coal expired. Another important year is 
1998 when all CEGB planned FGDs had been installed (there have been no 
further FGD installation till the end of our sample). These three periods for 
emissions overlap with the periods for fuel and labour identified above; and we 
will use the same labels. 
 
 
3 Literature 
3.1 Theoretical evidence for the effect of changes in ownership  
and competition on performance 
Whereas privatization implies a change in ownership, restructuring implies a 
change in industry structure, through horizontal or vertical unbundling and 
entry. The theoretical literature typically puts forward agency and property 
rights theories to understand the effects of privatization and restructuring on 
productive efficiency. A good summary of these theories in respect to 
privatization is provided by Megginson and Netter (2001) and Green and Haskel 
(2004). 
 
Agency theory (see for instance Laffont and Tirole, 1993) opens up the 
neoclassical black box of the firm or the government. It recognizes the 
importance of asymmetric information and incentives under the separation of 
management and control for management behaviour. Management is considered 
intrinsically effort-averse (Fabrizio et al., 2007) which allows changes in 
ownership to produce better incentives and better control and subsequently 
better performance. Though it is asserted that private ownership implies 
stronger incentives due to the threats of takeover and bankruptcy, it is not 
obvious why government is unable to provide similar incentives and monitoring 
unless it has different objectives. Public choice theory asserts that economic 
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welfare maximization is not the only government objective and that its other 
objectives might not necessarily support efficient production. 
 
Zhang et al. (2005) summarize the theoretical arguments for why privatization 
should increase economic efficiency: privatization improves incentives for 
management due to a change in the allocation of property rights, the discipline 
introduced by capital markets, the introduction of more precise and measurable 
objectives, and the removal of political interference. Agency theory also 
recognizes the disciplining effect of competition. Fabrizio et al. (2007) suggest 
the following ways for competition to impose discipline on management: 
rewards for efficiency gains, threat of entry, and better control through 
reduction in agency costs. These and others are discussed in more detail by 
Nickell (1996). Though generally applicable to electricity generation the 
discipline that competition exerts could be less than in other – more contestable 
– markets. 
 
When analysing privatizations several authors group the various effects 
predicted by these theories into three generic ones: management, privatization, 
and competition effect (in chronological order). Often management or 
management incentives change prior to privatization to prepare companies for 
sale or competition. At privatization management or management incentives 
might be improved further by the new owners. After privatization firms are 
typically exposed to competition which might increase pressure on management 
once more because now private owners are aided by the market (product and 
capital) for monitoring management. In reality these effects do not necessarily 
appear in chronological order. For instance, in the UK restructuring occurred 
both at privatization and again several years later. 
 
 
3.2 Empirical evidence for the effect of changes in ownership  
and competition on performance 
This section reviews the empirical evidence from UK privatizations in electricity 
and other industries as well as the evidence from US electricity restructuring. 
Although in the US the relevant change is not privatization, the experience is 
comparable as US restructuring typically implies vertical unbundling of 
generation accompanied by the introduction of wholesale and possibly retail 
competition. Since in the US restructuring occurs on a state-by-state basis many 
studies use difference-in-difference approaches allowing for a full counterfactual. 
Most UK studies – including the present one - assess the impact only in the time 
dimension producing potentially biased evidence. The empirical literature 
suggests several approaches to measure the impact on performance as discussed 
by Newbery and Pollitt (1997): financial performance, single factor productivity, 
total factor productivity (TFP), and full cost-benefit analysis. Each approach has 
its advantages and disadvantages as discussed by Green and Haskel (2004). For 
instance, often used measures of labour productivity do not recognize 
outsourcing and capital-labour substitution and capital investments after 
privatization lead to labour productivity improvements masking the effects of 
privatization. 
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3.2.1 Privatization studies 
There is a sizable literature on the effects of UK privatizations. Most studies 
perform before/after comparisons of labour or total factor productivity. Pollitt 
(2000) and Green and Haskel (2004) provide reviews. Pollitt (2000) concludes 
that privatizations themselves are not associated with higher productivity 
growth or profitability. However, management changes prior to privatization 
improve performance. After privatization, only firms that experience tighter 
regulation or fiercer competition improve performance. Generally, effects are 
greater for financial as opposed to productivity measures. Newbery and Pollitt 
(1997) conduct a full cost-benefit analysis of restructuring and privatization 
against the counterfactual of the continued operation of the vertically integrated 
and publicly-owned CEGB. In particular, they find that fuel and non-fuel 
operating costs declined after privatization. However, Newbery (1998, p. 3) 
argues that it is unlikely that performance improvements are due to 
privatization itself. He observes that Nuclear Electric which was exposed to 
competition in 1990 but itself only privatized in 1996 experienced similar 
performance improvements as other generators. Pollitt (1997) finds a similar 
result for the privatization of the electricity industry in Northern Ireland. 
Newbery (1995) provides anecdotal evidence that after privatization there was a 
“change in culture of CEGB, where being base and max. thermal efficiency must 
change to value flexibility”. It is not surprising that with restructuring 
commercial considerations became more important. Newbery’s observation also 
implies that though plants have a greater incentive to minimize inputs for a given 
output, strategic dispatch nevertheless might lead to lower operating efficiency. 
 
To summarize the evidence for UK privatizations (other than electricity) pre-
privatization restructuring and management effects tend to be stronger than the 
privatization effect. And the latter is weaker than restructuring and competition 
effects after privatization as shown by for instance, Haskel and Szymanski 
(1992) using labour productivity. These findings might be biased because the 
data can mask the true effect of privatization. Even if privatization itself has a 
lower impact than competition it is likely to be necessary to bring about 
competition. Green and Haskel (2004, p. 65) state: “But to the extent that pre-
privatization restructuring matters, the effect of privatization is rather subtle 
(and would not be picked up in conventional regression analysis of company 
performance).” Green and Haskel (2004, p. 105) summarize the literature on UK 
privatizations by saying: “Did privatization itself raise productivity? No. […] Did 
the process of privatization raise productivity? The answer is a resounding yes.” 
There is also a literature on international comparisons. For instance, O’Mahony 
(1999) analyzes labour productivity in the gas, electricity and water industries 
for several countries including the UK. She finds no visible break in UK labour 
productivity for the period 1973-1990 (though there is a drop in 1984 which 
could be due to the miners’ strike). But she shows a higher overall growth rate 
for the years after privatization. 
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3.2.2 US deregulation studies 
We also consider the empirical evidence from the restructuring of the US electric 
industry. There are several important differences between the UK and the US. In 
the US there has never been a nationally integrated state-owned electric industry 
and therefore also no “big bang” UK-style privatization though there exist 
municipality owned distribution companies. A disadvantage of the US is that it 
can even be more difficult to locate the policy change as often it is the cumulative 
result of several decisions by both state and federal regulators as well as the 
courts. 
 
A number of recent papers look at the effect of changes in regulation or 
restructuring on generation performance. Fabrizio et al. (2007) analyze the 
impact of ownership and competition on the efficiency of US electricity 
generation plants and find that investor-owned utilities in restructuring states 
reduced non-fuel expenses by up to 5 percent, labour input by 3 percent, and fuel 
input by up to 1.4 percent (though statistically insignificant) in comparison to 
firms in non-restructuring states. They use two counterfactuals: investor-owned 
utility (IOU) plants in non-restructuring states and municipality owned plants. 
They find that the gap with municipality owned utilities is larger than with IOU 
plants in non-restructuring states. This might imply either that IOU’s in non-
restructuring states are not a good control group because restructuring has spill-
over effects or that the effect of ownership adds to the effect of competition. Note 
that the latter interpretation would contradict the general evidence from UK 
privatizations that ownership itself is not very important; as well as the findings 
of Pollitt (1995) and Arocena and Waddams Price (2002) who generally find no 
difference between ownership types for an international and Spanish sample 
respectively though Arocena and Waddams Price (2002) find that this is only 
true under price-cap as opposed to rate of return regulation. Hiebert (2002) uses 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis to investigate the determinants of cost efficiency for 
a sample of generation plants for the years 1988-1997. He finds that 
restructuring led to decreases in mean inefficiency for coal-fired but not gas-
fired power plants and only finds mixed evidence for the effect of ownership. 
 
3.2.3 Emissions 
This paper is primarily concerned with the effect of privatization and 
competition on emissions efficiency, but the analysis also includes the effect of 
emissions regulation on traditional efficiency. It is difficult to disentangle the two 
because in the UK privatization and changes in environmental regulation 
coincide to some extent. And unlike for traditional inputs there is no coherent 
theory or empirical evidence on the effects of privatization, restructuring and 
competition on emissions. 
 
Fowlie (2005) analyses the impact of US electricity market restructuring on 
emissions by investigating management compliance choices. She shows that in a 
competitive market management rather changes operation (e.g. shutting down, 
or switching fuel) than investing in abatement technologies as competition 
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increases uncertainty and the cost of capital.11 Given that capital intensive 
abatement solutions are more effective as shown by Fowlie (2005) the 
introduction of competition increases emissions. Thus, the same mechanism - the 
substitution of low capital cost technologies (i.e. CCGT) for high capital cost 
technologies – that led to an increase in fuel efficiency might have decreased 
environmental efficiency. We know for the UK that some CEGB planned FGDs 
were eventually not built which is evidence in support of this argument. 
However, as we do not have an adequate counterfactual we cannot test this 
hypothesis. Using past performance as the counterfactual is likely to be a bigger 
problem for non-traditional than for traditional inputs. 
 
Fowlie (1999) indentifies a second mechanism through which increased 
competition can lead to an increase in emissions: the “load-factor effect”. Here 
competition leads sellers to adopt a pricing structure that increases off-peak 
demand (i.e. when load factors are calculated as average load divided by peak 
load-factors increase) and to the extent that coal provides base-load emissions 
increase. These arguments are based on the assumption that privatization and 
restructuring increase competition. Mansur (2007) on the other hand argues 
that restructuring might increase market power and thereby affect the output 
allocation across plants. Now the impact on emissions depends on the 
technology of the competitive fringe. Following this argument UK privatization 
should lower industry emissions because competitive new entry typically relied 
on low-emissions gas. As for traditional inputs an important issue is competition. 
But unlike for traditional inputs competition can be good or bad for emissions 
depending on the technology. To some extent these arguments assume that 
emissions constraints are not binding which might be true for parts of the US 
where polluters can buy permits. Arocena and Waddams Price (2002) find that 
in Spain emissions constraints were binding and when comparing public and 
private generators find that these constraints imply a higher cost for the latter in 
terms of forgone output. In the UK all the relevant instruments are command and 
control though as we argued above constraints might not be binding. 
 
There are theoretical arguments that environmental regulation negatively affects 
traditional input efficiency. First, environmental regulation might hamper 
product market competition through cost increases and restrictions on 
competition (Heyes, 2009). And as we saw above competition feeds back to 
emissions. Second, several papers investigate the hypothesis that environmental 
regulation reduces efficiency for traditional inputs. Gollop and Roberts (1983) 
and Bernstein et al. (1990) for instance show that productivity and efficiency 
decreased with the introduction of sulphur emission controls in the US. 
However, Barla and Perelman (2005) find that for 12 OECD countries sulphur 
emission restrictions have no effect on efficiency at the country level. They 
believe that this is the case because any negative effects are off-set by 
technological change that results from implementing the emission restrictions. 
 
                                                 
11 The literature is inconclusive as to whether competition increases innovation. Whereas some 
find that competition increases technological change others find the opposite. See for instance 
Levin et al. (1987), Hannan and McDowell (1984), and Genesove (1999). 
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To summarize, the literature provides evidence for a positive effect of 
privatization and competition on firm performance at least for traditional inputs. 
For non-traditional inputs the effect could be either way. Most authors agree that 
the biggest effects on traditional inputs are associated with changes in 
management incentives or competition irrespective of the actual change of 
ownership. 
 
 
4 Hypotheses 
For our hypotheses we will again distinguish the privatization (1990-1994), 
restructuring (1995-1998), and competition (1999-2002) periods as discussed 
above. The literature on privatization and restructuring acknowledges possible 
anticipatory effects in particular due to the change of management or 
management incentives before actual privatization. However, for the UK ESI we 
are not aware of any changes in management or management incentives before 
privatization. Our first hypothesis therefore is: 
 
Hypothesis 1: there is no break in the efficiency for any of the inputs before 
privatization. 
 
The literature on the effects of privatization concludes that privatization is 
necessary but not sufficient for significant performance improvements. This also 
seems to be the case here as privatization was followed several years later by a 
reduction of political interference in fuel choice, changes in market structure, 
and changes in trading regimes. However, management was free to shed labour 
at privatization. Therefore our second hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 2: there is no break associated with an efficiency increase for any of the 
inputs during the privatization period except for labour. 
 
Political interference decreased and competition developed in the second half of 
the 1990s when incumbents were forced to divest generation plants to 
competitors in 1996, retail competition started in 1998, and US firms entered the 
market around the same time. Assuming that labour had been reduced to 
efficient levels before our third hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 3: there is a break associated with an efficiency increase for fuel during 
the restructuring period. 
 
Last we turn to the three air emissions. All emissions and especially CO2 for 
which there is no abatement technology are closely related to fuel use. The same 
is true for SO2 and NOx once we control for abatement technologies. Therefore, 
and despite of not controlling for NOx abatement technology other than through 
plant-epoch fixed effects our fourth hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 4: there are no breaks for CO2, SO2, and NOx independently of any 
breaks in fuel efficiency. 
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And the relation between fuel efficiency and emissions efficiency should be 
positive for CO2 and SO2 but negative for NOx at least for gas-fired stations. 
 
 
5 Empirical Model 
Our model has three main characteristics: the generation technology, efficiency, 
and the structural breaks in efficiency. As usual efficiency is a function of the 
technology. Following Fabrizio et al. (2007) we derive plant-level factor 
demands from a behavioural model constraint by the technology. This model is 
somewhat different from a standard production model and has the advantage of 
being better suited to the input substitution patterns in electricity generation. It 
has the practical advantage of allowing us to estimate single factor demand 
functions without being constrained to a single factor efficiency measure. Also, 
individual demand functions allow different inputs to be affected by policy 
changes at different points in time. And we maximize the number of observations 
for each input as our data is highly unbalanced with gaps.12 
 
Fabrizio et al. (2007) start with the observation that a standard Cobb-Douglas 
production function where output is a function of current inputs is not a good 
representation of the short-run production decision at the plant level. They 
distinguish between “probable” and “actual” output. Observed or actual output 
could be more or less than planned output because actual demand differs from 
expected demand or because of unexpected changes in plant availability. Actual 
output is modelled as a Leontief production function of probable output and fuel 
input. Probable output is a function of capital which is embedded in the constant, 
labour, and materials. Thus, whereas non-fuel inputs are determined before 
production takes place fuel varies with actual production. The key feature of the 
model is that “actual” output equals “probable” output multiplied by a shock that 
is observed by the plant managers but not by the researcher. This Leontief 
production function allows for the medium-run substitution between material 
and labour but does not allow either to substitute for fuel in the short run. Also, 
in the short run capital cannot be substituted for and therefore is embedded in 
plant fixed effects. We slightly modify the original model and include non-
traditional inputs in the same way as traditional inputs. Equation (1) gives actual 
output: 
       
   
, , , , , , , , , , , ,
min
, , , , , exp
E E C C S S X X
it it it it it it it it
A
it
P P P A
it i it it it it
g E f C h S q X
Q
Q K L M
   
 
    
 
 
 
 (1) 
 
where AQ  and PQ stand for actual and probable output respectively and 
 *expA P Ait it itQ Q  . K, L, M, and E denote capital, labour, materials, and fuel input.  
C, S, and, X represent CO2, SO2, and NOx emissions. The reason for adding non-
traditional inputs in this fashion is that they are a function of fuel input and 
therefore are not decided upon before production takes place. Moreover, plant-
level emission limits might constrain production especially in the case that 
                                                 
12 When using a production function one could allow breaks associated with each individual 
input which should produce similar results. 
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abatement technology fails.  denotes the coefficient vectors and   represents 
standard error terms. 
 
In order to derive factor demands for labour and materials the model assumes 
cost-minimization behaviour constrained by a Cobb-Douglas production function 
where probable output is a function of capital, labour, and materials. Capital is 
not an input into the cost minimization problem because it is assumed fixed in 
the short run. The assumption of cost-minimization might be restrictive as it is 
likely that the CEGB (and possibly the privatized plants) did neither maximize 
productive nor allocative efficiency. Also the focus on the short run might 
underestimate the benefits of privatization as Arocena and Waddams Price 
(2002) find that private generators have a higher allocative efficiency in the long 
run. See Fabrizio et al. (2007) for the details of this derivation. The resulting 
labour demand equation is: 
 
1 2log( ) log( ) log( )
L A L L A
it it it i itL Q W        (2) 
 
Where labour is a function of actual output, capital (embedded in the constant) 
and the wage. Due to a lack of data we do not derive a demand for materials. 
Unlike for labour and materials fuel input does not depend on price. Its price 
only enters indirectly through the output the plant is dispatched to produce as 
the fuel price affects the merit order. Assuming that ( )g  is monotonically 
increasing inversion produces the following fuel demand equation: 
 
log( ) log( )E A E Eit i it i itE Q       (3) 
 
The same reasoning leads to the demand functions for CO2, SO2, and NOx: 
 
log( ) log( )C A C Cit i it i itC Q       (4) 
log( ) log( )S A S Sit i it i itS Q       (5) 
log( ) log( )X A X Xit i it i itX Q       (6) 
 
 
 
5.1 Identification 
Unlike Fabrizio et al. (2007) we have no cross-sectional control group as all UK 
thermal plants were privatized in 1990 (or shortly thereafter in Scotland in 1991 
and Northern Ireland in 1992). We identify the impact of privatization and 
competition as structural breaks across time. Our counterfactual is a plant’s own 
past performance. A weakness of this approach is that we cannot distinguish 
between the impact of the natural experiment(s), i.e. privatization and related 
policy changes and other changes in time like changes in ownership after 
privatization. Waddams Price and Weyman-Jones (1996) regress an efficiency 
score on a regime dummy and a trend interpreting the later as underlying 
technical change and therefore part of the counterfactual. 
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Building on our theoretical model above, Equations (1) to (6) we introduce a 
generic input demand equation where input N (Fuel, Labour, CO2, SO2, NOx) for 
firm i in year t and regime r is a function of output (NET GWH), input price 
(PRICE), an indicator for the presence of FGD plant (FGD), a variable measuring 
the vintage of the plant (AGE), plant-epoch fixed effects (
N
i ), a trend (t), and a 
regime constant (POST) that switches on after a given year. Plant-epoch effects 
represent a given plant for the period where its capacity does not change. 
Depending on how often its capacity changes a plant is associated with several 
plant-epoch effects. Note that the FGD indicator captures the presence but not 
necessarily the operation of the FGD. We opt to include a trend instead of year-
fixed effects because the latter absorb all the variation across regimes and thus 
produce constant values for the break test statistic. 
 
 
1 2 3 4
5
log( ) log(  G ) log( ) log( )N N N N Nirt irt irt irt irt
N N N N
irt i irt
N NET WH PRICE FGD AGE
POST t
   
  
   
   
 (7) 
 
The regime constant allows for different average input usage for given output 
between regimes, i.e. the periods before and after the break. Thus, the intercept 
change is common for all plants and the regime constant can vary with the 
sample composition in spite of the inclusion of fixed effects. Alternatively one 
could allow each plant to break at a different date (or not at all). One issue here is 
that such an approach would not allow for plant-epoch effects as it requires 
plant-fixed effects. For fuel and the non-traditional input demands we drop the 
terms including price following our theoretical model above. And for labour we 
observe the wage at the regional instead of plant level. The wage variable is 
nominal and based on data from the New Earnings Survey (published by the UK 
Office for National Statistics). This is a partial change model as we do not allow 
all coefficients to change with the regime. The implicit Null for all hypotheses 
is 5 0
N  . 
 
We include a variable for age because an important determinant of a plant’s 
efficiency is its vintage according to Bantock and Longhurst (1995). Joskow and 
Schmalensee (1987) find that plant performance “deteriorates significantly” with 
age. There seems to be a trade-off between thermal efficiency and reliability 
(companies retreat from the technological frontier but in-house engineering and 
design leads to better performance). However, Hiebert (2002) states that length 
of service might actually increase performance as local management learns to 
better operate the plant. Pollitt (1995, p. 132) finds no significant age effect for a 
sample of base load plants. The trend variable should pick up exogenous changes 
in technology. There remain potentially important factors that we cannot control 
for, such as an individual plant’s rank in the merit order. After privatization 
different plants might have been called on, peaking plants might be different, 
which would affect average performance as discussed by Knittel (2002). 
 
For each demand equation we model a single, abrupt, and known or unknown 
break. The model is restricted in these ways for the following reasons. Though 
the actual break might be gradual to model the break as abrupt is more 
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parsimonious and allows for formal inference. The assumption of a single break 
could be relaxed. Bai (1997) proposes an iterative procedure where first a break 
is identified, then the sample split at the break, and each sub-sample is tested for 
a break. But as our sample is rather short we do not do this here. Unlike many 
previous studies we do not assume that the break dates are known. The reason is 
that even though the dates for the various regulatory changes are known there is 
no theoretical guidance as to when exactly the impact occurs as discussed above. 
The literature distinguishes between testing for structural breaks and estimating 
a particular break date. We follow this distinction and use a standard F-test to 
test for structural breaks and the global minimum of the sum of squared 
residuals (SSR) of the unrestricted model (i.e. allowing for breaks) as an estimate 
for the break date (Bai, 1994). The F-test is based on the general idea that when 
the break point is unknown and the error variance is the same across the two 
regimes one should select the break point which corresponds to the smallest 
total sum of squared residuals (or the highest F-statistic) (Kennedy, 2003, p. 
113). The maximum F and the minimum SSR coincide only if the errors are 
homoskedatic. Moreover, Hansen (1997) suggests that local minima of the SSR 
can be viewed “cautiously” as estimates of multiple breaks. If the break date is 
known the F-statistic (Chow-statistic) is a good statistic when testing for a 
structural break. However, if the break date is unknown a better statistic is the 
maximum F-statistic (Quandt-statistic) for a sequence of F-statistics over a 
window of candidate break dates (Quandt, 1960). Hansen (2001) explains that 
the Quandt statistic is to be preferred because using the Chow-statistic similar 
break dates (i.e. adjacent years) can produce different results. The critical values 
for the Chow-statistic and the Quandt statistic differ. If the break date is known 
the test statistic follows an F-distribution if not it follows a non-standard 
distribution derived and tabulated by Andrews (1993) and Andrews (2003)13. 
The Andrews critical values tend to be twice as high as the values of the F-
distribution. Intuitively, the test is more “demanding” because the break is 
unknown. Our window for candidate break dates is 1985-2002 which implies a 
trim factor of about 0.15 for the Andrews critical values. This window opens 
several years before privatization and closes one year after the introduction of 
NETA in March 2001. 
 
Another issue for identification is that supply is likely to be endogenous because 
it is correlated with shocks. For instance a production failure would reduce 
output and fuel input simultaneously. Fabrizio et al. (2007) tackle this issue 
using state-level demand as an instrument for supply. But even though 
endogeneity biases the coefficient estimates it does not bias the test for 
structural change according to Perron and Yamamoto (2008). Actually break 
tests based on instrumental variable (IV) regressors are less precise than tests 
based on standard OLS regressors. One reason for this result is that the 
generated IV regressors have less quadratic variation than the original 
regressors. We use robust OLS estimators to test for structural breaks and a 
robust generalized method of moments instrumental variable estimator 
                                                 
13 The critical values are tabulated by p, the number of coefficients that are allowed to change and 
π, the trim factor. A trim factor is expressed as a fraction between 0 and 1 and gives the interval 
[π, 1-π] of the sample over which breaks are allowed to occur. Thus if the sample is of length 10 
π=0.2 implies that the window for candidate breaks is observations 2 to 8. 
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(GMMIV) to estimate the coefficients associated with the breaks. The 
instruments for supply are the plant’s fuel type and the total supply by CCGT and 
nuclear plants. All three instruments should be uncorrelated with shocks to plant 
availability. But at the same time the instruments reflect a plant’s position in the 
merit order and therefore are correlated with supply. Using these instruments 
we find that supply is endogenous. Last there is attrition. The entry and exit of 
plants might be important for our results because different plant types react 
differently to changes in ownership and competition. For instance, firms might 
decide to improve performance only at specific plants in response to policy 
changes. This is important because our regime dummy captures the average 
effect across plants. In order to see how the industry-level plant mix affects our 
results we alternatively restrict our full sample to plants that are observed for at 
least 19 out of 25 years. Effectively the restricted sample consists of coal-fired 
stations that we observe both before and after privatization. The data, variables 
and samples are described in more detail in the next section. 
 
 
6 Data and Summary Statistics 
Several people have compiled our data set over several years. Besides firm and 
industry publication we also obtained data from several companies directly. Our 
full sample includes conventional thermal plants, CCGT plants, and a few CHP 
plants. Nuclear and renewable plants are excluded because for non-thermal 
generators the measurement of fuel input is not straight forward. Also, they do 
not produce the same emissions as thermal plants.14 Due to its patch work 
collection the data has several shortcomings. We know (or suspect) that 
sometimes different sources define the variables in different ways. For instance, 
whereas some data is based on financial years other data is based on calendar 
years. We correct for this by constructing calendar year data from the weighted 
financial year data (weights are simply the number of months). There are large 
gaps in our data. Figure 2 and Figure 3 illustrate these gaps for the supply 
variable (i.e. electricity output) for the full and restricted samples respectively. It 
gives the count of identified observations by year and fuel in the upper panel and 
the count of observations for which supply is not missing in the lower panel. 
 
                                                 
14 This point is also discussed by Pollitt (1995, p. 26, endnote 3). 
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Figure 2: Count of Observations by Year (Full Sample) 
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Figure 3: Count of Observations by Year (Restricted Sample) 
 
For the full sample it is interesting to see that in the absence of any reporting 
obligations starting just before privatization it is much more difficult to obtain 
the data. But this trend seems reversed in the late 1990s possibly due to 
mandatory environmental reporting and possibly the industry reached a new 
equilibrium where non-reporting conferred no competitive advantage any 
longer. Therefore we cannot say that the missing values are entirely random in 
the time-series. But we have no reason to believe that the same is true for the 
cross-section. For the restricted sample there are much fewer gaps throughout 
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the 1990s. Note that the drop in the number of observations towards the end of 
the samples is likely to be due to closure of older coal-fired stations. The two 
figures also allow us to compare the plant mix across the two samples. Whereas 
all plant types are included in the full sample only coal and oil plants are 
included in the restricted sample. 
 
In order to minimise the number of gaps we derived missing observation where 
possible. For instance, missing observations for CO2 emissions were derived 
from supply. The appendix gives more detail on these calculations. Though filling 
gaps this way may introduce some bias we believe it is better than having an 
even larger number of missing observations. One potential bias we are aware of 
is the derivation of CO2 before privatization. Since there is virtually no data 
available on emissions before privatization we derived CO2 from supply for 
these years. The result is that fuel and CO2 efficiency in our sample (see Figure 
4) are more closely related than it is likely to be actually the case. We believe that 
plants as well derive emissions from fuel input for reporting purposes. For SO2 
and NOx we did not attempt to fill the missing values before privatization 
because the relationship between fuel and emissions is less straightforward. All 
the variables and their measurements are summarized in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Variables and Measurement 
    
Variable Definition 
Dependent variables 
Fuel log (Mtce/year) 
Labour log (number of employees/year) 
CO2  log (kt CO2 /year) 
SO2  log (kt SO2 /year) 
NOx  log (kt NOx /year) 
Independent variables 
Supply (NET GWH) log (net GWh/year) 
Capacity log (net MW) 
FGD  1 if FGD fitted; 0 otherwise 
Age number of years since first unit commissioned 
Trend  time trend 
Wage log (regional wage, index) 
POST structural break indicator: 1 if year >= year of 
break; 0 otherwise 
 
Table 4 gives summary statistics. Note that due to the gaps in the data the 
number of observations varies greatly between the different variables. Overall 
the data set covers the years 1980 to 2004 except for SO2 and NOx. For these 
two emissions our data set only starts in 1988 slightly weakening our results as 
effectively we are not able to investigate breaks before or at privatization but 
only afterwards. When comparing the full and restricted samples we see that the 
number of observations is more than halved. Mean values for fuel input, supply, 
and capacity are much higher indicating that the restricted sample contains 
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much larger plants. Also, the mean value for age for the restricted sample is 
double that of the full sample. 
 
Table 4: Summary Statistics 
 
                    
Variable Full Sample Restricted Sample 
 
Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
Fuel 1149 1.532 1.702 0.001 11.038 456 2.657 2.066 0.003 11.038 
Labour 445 272.249 235.016 1.000 1130.000 217 428.871 243.130 41.000 1130.000 
CO2 1176 3235.121 3827.232 1.488 25100.000 466 5935.283 4647.307 5.630 25100.000 
SO2 533 31.888 46.784 0.000 269.300 245 59.414 55.591 0.243 269.300 
NOx 615 9.132 13.401 0.000 87.979 245 18.200 16.493 0.090 87.979 
Supply 1175 4068.328 4538.680 1.000 29000.000 456 6854.263 5550.595 5.375 29000.000 
Capacity 1493 886.730 778.557 31.000 3960.000 523 1547.373 826.227 120.000 3960.000 
Load factor 1155 45.121 29.268 0.151 176.574 452 46.279 24.755 0.151 104.967 
Wage 1437 272.327 92.844 99.271 474.250 493 267.790 87.191 101.500 466.711 
Age 1438 18.525 11.011 0.000 47.000 514 22.767 9.288 0.000 47.000 
 
Table 5 gives the correlation matrix for the full sample. We do not report the 
correlations for the restricted sample as they are fairly similar. All the inputs are 
positively correlated with supply and capacity. Naturally, these correlations are 
the lowest for labour. One interesting observation is that all inputs are positively 
correlated with the age but negatively correlated with the trend suggesting that 
they contain different information and should both be included in the model. 
 
Table 5: Pearson Correlations (Full Sample) 
                          
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Fuel 1 1 
          Labour 2 0.68 1 
         CO2 3 0.99 0.73 1 
        SO2 4 0.81 0.80 0.85 1 
       NOx 5 0.91 0.82 0.94 0.91 1 
      Supply 6 0.98 0.59 0.94 0.73 0.84 1 
     Capacity 7 0.77 0.55 0.77 0.60 0.67 0.74 1 
    Load factor 8 0.39 0.03 0.33 0.21 0.26 0.48 -0.02 1 
   Wage 9 -0.12 -0.63 -0.18 -0.42 -0.35 -0.04 -0.10 0.29 1 
  Age 10 0.10 0.31 0.18 0.22 0.23 -0.03 0.09 -0.42 -0.19 1 
 Year 11 -0.10 -0.59 -0.15 -0.41 -0.32 -0.03 -0.06 0.26 0.98 -0.15 1 
 
 
Next we plot indices for input efficiencies on a log scale (so that lines of constant 
slope have a constant growth rate) for the full sample in Figure 4. These indices 
are cross-sectional averages indexed on the year of privatization, 1990. Labour 
efficiency decreases till privatization and increases dramatically thereafter. Fuel, 
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CO2, SO2, and NOx efficiencies are virtually unchanged till about 1992 when they 
start increasing. For fuel and CO2 this upward trend stops in 2000, which is 
likely due to the moratorium on new gas-fired generation and a subsequent 
increase in coal burn. There is no visual evidence for a clear structural break 
around privatization in 1990 except possibly for labour. For the restricted 
sample (not shown) the picture is similar though efficiencies increase by less. 
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Figure 4: Index of Average Input Efficiencies 
 
 
 
7 Results 
Results are presented by demand equation and sample. They distinguish 
between the break date meaning the year where a break occurs and the 
corresponding intercept coefficient which gives the level change in efficiency. 
Table 6 gives the years and intercept coefficients for the statistically significant 
break dates for the full and restricted samples. Recall that whereas the full 
sample includes all fossil fuel plants the restricted sample essentially consists of 
coal-fired stations only. 
 
In Table 6 the first column gives the inputs where every first row is for the full 
sample and every second row for the restricted sample. The second column gives 
the primary break dates (the global minimum for the SSR). The third and fourth 
columns give additional (tentative) break dates (up to two and in increasing 
order of the SSR). The econometric significance of the break dates depends on 
whether the F-statistic is higher than the F or Andrews critical value for known 
or unknown breaks respectively. Both tests have a size of 5%. All primary break 
 24 
dates except for fuel for the full sample are statistically significant at the 
Andrews critical value. For the full sample for fuel the F-statistic stays just below 
the critical value for an unknown break. Strictly speaking when searching for a 
break using the full sample the data does not reject the null hypothesis that there 
is no break. The last three columns give the coefficients (expressed in percent) 
associated with these break dates. A negative coefficient sign implies that input 
efficiency increases meaning that after the break plants on average use less input 
for a given supply. Note that not all coefficient signs are negative and several 
break dates are associated with decreasing efficiency. It seems that results differ 
more across inputs than across samples. 
 
Next, Figure 5 plots the same percentage changes associated with the intercept 
coefficients against the candidate break dates for all break dates irrespective of 
the breaks statistical significance. For instance, the first row in Table 6 shows 
that for fuel efficiency for the full sample the break occurs in 1996 and is 
associated with an efficiency increase of 5.6 percent which means that for a given 
output 5.6 percent less inputs are needed for the years after 1996 as compared 
to the years before. The same 5.6 percent can be read from the left panel of 
Figure 5 for the line with the round dots. The results in Table 6 and Figure 5 are 
extracted from Figure 6 to Figure 10 and Table 7 in the appendices which 
provide all results. Figure 6 to Figure 10 plot the SSR (right y-axis) and F-
statistics (left y-axis). The dashed lines give the F and the dotted lines the 
Andrews critical values respectively. 
 
Table 6: Summary of Break Dates and Coefficients 
              
Input (1
st
 row 
full/2
nd
 row 
restricted sample) 
Break dates (min. SSR) Intercept change at break dates (%) 
 
Global Local 1 Local 2 Global Local 1 Local 2 
Fuel 1996' 1990' 
 
-5.60* 8.11** 
 
 
1996'' 1990'' 1999'' -4.88** 11.20*** -5.93* 
Labour 1992'' 2001'' 
 
-30.39*** 18.73** 
 
 
1992'' 1994'' 1999'' -23.06*** -23.91*** 34.02*** 
CO2 1990'' 1995' 
 
7.19*** -4.03 
 
 
1990'' 2000' 1995'' 6.52* -5.31 0.63 
SO2 1994'' 2000'' 
 
48.28** -22.55* 
 
 
1991'' 2001'' 
 
52.98*** -25.78*** 
 
NOx 1993'' 1996' 2001' -23.03*** -14.35** 13.00*** 
 
1996'' 
  
-4.79 
  
'' F > 5% Andrews, ' F > 5% F 
    Robust p-values: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 5: Efficiency Change for Given Break Date 
 
During the privatization period (1990-1994) we find a primary break for labour 
corresponding to an efficiency increase of about 30 percent. Figure 7 in the 
appendices shows that the test statistic for the full sample (upper panel) drops 
sharply in 1989 and reaches a minimum in 1992 suggesting that labour 
reductions started just before privatization. The break date is the same for both 
samples though the efficiency increase is lower for the restricted sample 
(compare the panels in Figure 5) which might be due to the fact that CCGT plants 
generally require less labour and therefore the true effect of privatization is 
overestimated for the full sample. This is true even though our model accounts 
for fixed effects because our regime dummy picks up the average change across 
plants which might change with the composition of the sample. For fuel we only 
find a secondary break in this period which surprisingly is associated with an 8.1 
percent decrease in efficiency. There is only a small difference between the two 
samples. One possible explanation for this result is decreasing load factors at 
privatization possibly driven by market power. Another explanation might be 
political pressure to burn inefficiently large amounts of British coal. We find 
primary breaks for all three emissions though only the break for NOx is 
associated with an efficiency increase. As CO2 and fuel are highly correlated the 
break for CO2 occurs in the same year as a break for fuel and both have similar 
quantitative impacts. The breaks for SO2 occur in 1994 and 1991 for the full and 
restricted samples respectively and are associated with about a 50 percent 
decrease in efficiency. The break for the full sample occurs at about the time 
when CCGT generation starts to increase dramatically and when the first FGD is 
installed at Ratcliffe. As we control for FGD and plant-fixed effects the efficiency 
decrease might capture the effect FGDs and CCGTs had on other plants by 
loosening their emission constraints. As emission limits typically operate at the 
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firm or industry level it is possible that once FGDs and CCGTs operate other 
plants are free to emit more. Though it is not obvious why the break for the 
restricted samples occurs several years earlier. For NOx the break occurs in 1993 
shortly after privatization and just when CCGT generation takes off. It is 
associated with an efficiency increase of about 23 percent. Comparing the two 
samples it is possible that the inclusion of CCGT plants explains the break in 
1993 for the full sample as these were generally fitted with low-NOx burners, 
which is not captured by the fixed effects if operation of such equipment varies 
across time as suggested by Martin et al. (2007) for the US. 
 
The restructuring period (1995 to 1998) sees the primary break for fuel in 1996 
the year when the two incumbents were mandated to divest generation assets to 
competitors. This break is associated with an efficiency increase of about 5 
percent for both samples which is interesting because it indicates that the effect 
is the same for various types of plants. Again there is a comparable break for CO2 
in the same year. There is no further break for labour in this period. There is a 
secondary break for NOx, again associated with an increase in efficiency. As we 
do not control for the fitting of NOx abatement technology this might explain 
both efficiency increases. However, individually the increases fall short of the 
expected 30 percent (see p. 20). 
 
During the competition period (1999-2002) no primary breaks occur. For fuel a 
second local minimum in 1999 is only observed for the restricted sample 
suggesting that increased competition in the late 1990s mostly affected coal-
fired plants. And even though these plants are also included in the full sample the 
effect might be masked. Also, for labour there is a secondary break associated 
with a decrease in efficiency. This result confirms anecdotal evidence that right 
after privatization labour was reduced to an extent that might have 
compromised operational safety forcing an increase in staff levels during the late 
1990s. There is a more pronounced dip in 1999 for the restricted sample 
suggesting that is was mostly at older coal-fired plants were the initial lay-offs 
were reversed. Next, there is a second and third break for SO2 and NOx 
respectively. Whereas SO2 efficiency increases it decreases for NOx. For SO2 the 
drop in emissions of about 20 percent might capture the effect of older plant 
retiring or coal-fired plants switched to less sulphur rich coal. That the effect is 
larger for the restricted sample supports this explanation. Again the installation 
of FGD should not affect the results for SO2. Though for the FGD plants the FGD 
and regime indicators are correlated and it is not clear whether the overall effect 
is correctly attributed. For NOx the efficiency decrease in 2001 occurs shortly 
after the overall amount of coal burn increased again in 1999 due to a 
moratorium on gas fired plant. The increase in NOx emissions might also be 
explained by stronger competition leading plants to trade-off higher NOx 
emissions for more output. That the break coefficients for fuel and NOx have the 
opposite signs for this period is clearly shown in the left panel of Figure 5. But 
we do not observe this for the right panel confirming that the trade-off between 
fuel and NOx efficiency mostly exists for gas-fired stations which are not 
included in the restricted sample. 
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8 Discussion and Conclusion 
We find evidence that privatization and subsequent changes in regulation and 
market structure had a significant positive impact on plant-level efficiencies for 
traditional and non-traditional inputs over the decade 1990 to 2000. However, 
not all the efficiency changes were always positive. 
 
Generally, the positive effects we observe are much stronger than the effects 
reported by for instance Fabrizio et al. (2007). Whereas they find no significant 
effect of US restructuring on fuel efficiency we find efficiency increases up to 5 
percent. For labour they find effects up to 3 percent where we find effects up to 
30 percent! We believe that this is due to the different contexts. In the US most 
plants have always been privately owned and regulated. Restructuring should 
have a lower impact than the more radical changes in ownership and regulation 
that took place in the UK. The difference also highlights that the inefficiencies 
that public ownership accumulated in the UK were much higher than the 
inefficiencies that rate of return regulation accumulated in the US.15 
 
Now we discuss our four hypotheses. We find evidence in support of our first 
hypothesis that there is no break in any of the inputs before privatization. There 
are several reasons why performance did not improve in anticipation of 
privatization. Only in 1988 was it certain that privatization would go ahead. And, 
at the time it was obvious to the players that full competition would not 
materialize for at least a couple of years after privatization. This result is 
markedly different from earlier UK privatizations where performance often 
improved in anticipation of privatization. For instance, Waddams Price and 
Weyman-Jones (1996) find structural breaks for the efficiency of British Gas 
several years before privatization. Nevertheless, they find the strongest evidence 
for a break at the date of privatization. The same is true for electricity 
restructuring in the US where Fabrizio et al. (2007) show that efficiency 
improvements occur in anticipation of restructuring. But unlike for other UK 
privatizations for electricity labour productivity only increased at privatization. 
 
Our results provide evidence in favour of our second hypothesis that there is no 
break associated with an efficiency increase for any of the inputs during the 
privatization period except for labour. This is not surprising. We know that the 
CEGB was probably overstaffed and electricity workers had less bargaining 
power than miners or the new shareholders. But there were no involuntary lay-
off and it seems that redundancy packages might have transferred some of the 
rents from privatization to employees. Also, the quantitative result is likely to 
overestimate the true effect on employment as we do not account for 
outsourcing after privatization. Unexpectedly we also find a secondary break for 
fuel. However, as the break is associated with a decrease in efficiency it provides 
no evidence against our hypothesis. 
 
We find evidence in support of our third hypothesis that there is a break 
associated with an efficiency increase for fuel during the restructuring period. 
                                                 
15 The argument that rate of return regulated firms over-invest goes back to Averch and Johnson 
(1962) though empirical studies were not able to prove the effect conclusively. 
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The break occurs in 1996 the year when market concentration fell because the 
two incumbents were forced to divest plants to competitors. This result is in line 
with the theoretical and empirical literatures both suggesting that competition is 
much more important for performance than ownership. What is more striking 
(and worrying for shareholders) is that this implies that generators failed to 
minimize cost instead of just failing to pass on cost savings to customers 
supporting Hicks (1935) “quiet life” hypothesis. The result also underlines the 
danger of using financial performance indicators which can mask underlying 
technical performance. 
 
We find mixed evidence for our fourth hypothesis that there is no break for CO2, 
SO2, and NOx independently of any breaks in fuel efficiency. The breaks for CO2 
are almost the same as for fuel which is not surprising as the two are highly 
correlated due to the absence of any abatement technologies for CO2. On the 
other hand the breaks for SO2 and NOx are mostly independent of the breaks for 
fuel. Breaks for these emissions are likely to relate to abatement effort that we 
do not model (i.e. other than the installation of FGD). Such efforts include 
installation of abatement technology, burning of different coal type, and 
operational change. What is maybe the most interesting result is that once we 
account for fuel switching at the industry level and the installation of FGDs we 
actually observe efficiency decreases for emissions in some cases. Large 
reductions of emissions at some plant might allow higher emissions at other 
plants as long as plant-level caps are not binding. Also for the other inputs it 
might be that a firm- as opposed to a plant-level analysis might produce 
somewhat different results. 
 
Our approach has several shortcomings. First, we are aware that there are 
several measurement inconsistencies as well as gaps in the data which we tried 
to overcome. Second, the data provides no counterfactual except for firms’ own 
past performances. But even if a control group was available constructing a 
counterfactual would not be straight forward because certain changes like the 
installation of abatement technology were planned before privatization but only 
installed afterwards (and the announcement of privatization might have changed 
these plans). Third, the empirical model assumes that there is a common, single, 
and abrupt break in each input demand equation. Looking at our descriptive 
statistics it seems that some efficiencies are more likely to exhibit a gradual shift. 
In the future we will explore possibilities to overcome these shortcomings. 
 
On the other hand our approach has certain strengths. We have compiled a new 
plant-level panel data set that spans about ten years before and after 
privatization which allows for a more robust analysis of the events around 
privatization. Instead of financial indicators we use productivity as performance 
measure which gives a more realistic picture. Using efficiency based on physical 
data might be one reason why our results differ from the results of studies of 
other UK privatizations (Pollitt, 1995, p. 26). In particular, other industries 
showed performance improvements in anticipation of privatization. We also 
include emissions as non-traditional inputs though we only have shorter and 
incomplete series for emissions at the plant level. The main advantage of our 
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model is that we do not presuppose that breaks take place at any particular date 
or that breaks are common for different inputs. 
 
As plant fixed effects do not sufficiently control for unobserved heterogeneity 
and efficiency changes might not be the same across plant types we use two 
different samples. Fixed effects do not capture changes in the merit order and 
associated changes in operation as well as abatement efforts other than FGD. 
Secondly, we only account for the average efficiency impact of breaks across 
plant-types. As our results somewhat differ across the two sample we believe 
that plant-level time-variant factors are important and that efficiency changes 
vary across plants. 
 
Also we allow for inference for known or unknown breaks. This distinction might 
seem philosophical but stresses that if we do not know the potential break date 
in advance more evidence is required to infer that there is a break. Our results 
are mostly strong enough to infer an unknown break. The exception is fuel where 
for the full sample the test statistic just fails to clear the hurdle for an unknown 
break. 
 
Future research might compare different ways to empirically model the break 
including the possibility of multiple breaks. Also, a comparison between firm and 
plant-level efficiencies might be of interest. We conclude that electricity 
privatization like most other UK privatizations was a unique experience. 
Privatization itself in spite of strong market power led to a dramatic increase in 
labour productivity. On the other hand for fuel and emissions efficiency 
privatization might have been necessary but certainly not sufficient to bring 
about improvement. Aggregate emission limits might have lead to emission 
increases at individual plants in response to abatement efforts elsewhere which 
might be efficient as long as the aggregate caps are effective. 
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9 Appendices 
9.1 Results 
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Figure 6: Test for Structural Change: Fuel Demand 
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Figure 7: Test for Structural Change: Labour Demand 
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Figure 8: Test for Structural Change: CO2 Demand 
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Figure 9: Test for Structural Change: SO2 Demand 
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Figure 10: Test for Structural Change: NOx Demand 
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Table 7: Intercept Change (%) 
 
  
 
                  
Year Fuel Labour CO2 SO2 NOx 
 
Full Restricted Full Restricted Full Restricted Full Restricted Full Restricted 
1985 -2.702 -5.168 31.179 8.774 -1.670 -8.241 
    
 
[0.17]  [0.03]** [0]*** [0.37]  [0.26]  [0]*** 
    
1986 -3.709 -2.927 26.099 5.614 -2.897 -6.234 
    
 
[0.14]  [0.07]* [0]*** [0.45]  [0.09]* [0]*** 
    
1987 -0.437 1.549 18.198 -1.855 0.296 -2.134 
    
 
[0.87]  [0.36]  [0.01]** [0.8]  [0.87]  [0.16]  
    
1988 4.492 4.915 2.597 -5.236 4.656 1.303 
    
 
[0.12] [0.01]*** [0.6]  [0.32]  [0.04]** [0.37]  
    
1989 6.604 8.072 -6.597 -7.383 6.211 3.965 
    
 
[0.02]** [0]*** [0.2]  [0.12]  [0.01]*** [0.08]* 
    
1990 8.105 11.210 -25.201 -20.619 7.185 6.516 26.537 38.991 -3.117 4.935 
 
[0.02]** [0]*** [0]*** [0]*** [0.01]*** [0.06]* [0.16]  [0]*** [0.66]  [0.52]  
1991 2.194 8.687 -39.287 -25.801 -0.187 5.081 21.013 52.977 -12.108 9.189 
 
[0.59]  [0.01]** [0]*** [0]*** [0.97]  [0.15]  [0.32]  [0]*** [0.12]  [0.17]  
1992 3.292 8.026 -30.388 -23.058 0.351 5.722 17.665 49.481 -19.739 8.002 
 
[0.43]  [0]*** [0]*** [0]*** [0.91]  [0]*** [0.39]  [0]*** [0.02]** [0.04]** 
1993 1.802 4.726 -33.435 -17.511 -0.969 3.539 22.100 45.528 -23.031 8.687 
 
[0.54]  [0.01]*** [0]*** [0]*** [0.73]  [0.05]* [0.23]  [0]*** [0]*** [0.07]* 
1994 0.908 1.465 -29.295 -23.906 -2.125 0.602 48.276 43.057 -18.356 6.356 
 
[0.79]  [0.43]  [0]*** [0]*** [0.44]  [0.7]  [0.04]** [0]*** [0.02]** [0.35]  
1995 -2.326 0.252 -25.236 -22.461 -4.030 0.629 32.030 25.072 -15.281 2.660 
 
[0.54]  [0.89]  [0]*** [0]*** [0.26]  [0.69]  [0.15]  [0.07]* [0.03]** [0.71]  
1996 -5.595 -4.880 -7.226 -5.483 -5.029 2.298 0.055 -1.509 -14.350 -4.787 
 
[0.1]* [0.03]** [0.27]  [0.4]  [0.09]* [0.19]  [0.94]  [0.94]  [0.01]** [0.49]  
1997 -1.929 -1.495 3.459 16.437 -1.634 5.576 -9.017 -8.833 -4.156 -2.127 
 
[0.58]  [0.56]  [0.61]  [0.12]  [0.56]  [0.03]** [0.63]  [0.48]  [0.6]  [0.79]  
1998 -1.405 -1.133 9.710 28.389 -0.071 5.498 -11.491 -8.972 1.569 -0.669 
 
[0.65]  [0.67]  [0.16]  [0]*** [0.99]  [0.03]** [0.4]  [0.23]  [0.81]  [0.93]  
1999 -1.033 -5.927 13.181 34.016 2.493 -0.299 -14.810 -18.438 6.795 -5.326 
 
[0.73]  [0.05]* [0.07]* [0]*** [0.28]  [0.94]  [0.13]  [0]*** [0.28]  [0.34]  
2000 0.428 -5.987 11.218 9.197 0.291 -5.309 -22.549 -23.037 10.277 -9.604 
 
[0.85]  [0.06]* [0.13]  [0.18]  [0.88]  [0.15]  [0.01]*** [0]*** [0.04]** [0.07]* 
2001 0.980 -4.538 18.722 14.439 0.586 -3.556 -13.070 -25.784 12.995 -5.054 
 
[0.68]  [0.2]  [0.01]** [0.08]* [0.77]  [0.36]  [0.16]  [0]*** [0]*** [0.33]  
2002 0.040 -4.788 17.755 13.680 -1.553 -3.396 -18.293 -23.963 8.011 -3.729 
  [0.98]  [0.05]* [0.05]* [0.16]  [0.42]  [0.28]  [0.08]* [0]*** [0.09]* [0.43]  
p-values in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
includes plant-epoch fixed effects 
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9.2 Data calculations 
Our sample has many missing values. Where possible we filled missing values as 
follows: 
 
 Supply is derived from CO2 emissions (and vice versa) using generic 
efficiency measures where necessary (Table 8). The formula is: 
 
where: 
EF = Emissions Factor (Table 10) 
Eff = Thermal Efficiency (actual or Table 8) 
Kt = Thousand tonnes 
 
 Fuel input is derived from CO2. Note that we do not derive fuel input from 
supply directly. The formula is: 
 
where: 
EF = Emissions Factor (Table 10) 
CF = Conversion factor (fuel dependent) 
CV = Heat content (Table 12) 
Kt = Thousand tonnes. 
 
For gas the equation looks as follows 
 
 
Also, for comparability all fuel input amounts are converted in Mtce (million 
tonnes of coal equivalent) given the fuel’s calorific value and the energy content 
of tce as given in Table 11. 
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Table 8: Thermal Efficiencies by Fuel 
      
Fuel Thermal efficiency (%) Source/Comment 
Coal 0.36 DUKES 2005, average 1999-2003 
Gas 
(conventional) 
0.36 Assumed to be the same as for coal 
CCGT 0.467 DUKES 2005, average 1999-2003 
Oil 0.324 Electricity Handbook  1987-1989, 
average for plants in sample 
CHP 0.7 DUKES 2009, Table 6D 
 
 
Table 9: Plant Load Factors 
      
Year 
Conventional 
Thermal 
CCGT 
2004 n/a n/a 
2003 50 59.8 
2002 42.3 68.4 
2001 42.1 66.6 
2000 39.4 75 
1999 35.3 84 
source: DUKES, various years 
 
 
 
Table 10: Emissions Factors 
      
Fuel 
kg(CO2)/kWh 
(energy input) 
kWh/kg(CO2) or 
GWh/kt(CO2) 
Natural Gas  0.19 5.26 
Gas/Diesel Oil  0.25 4 
Petrol   0.24 4.17 
Heavy Fuel Oil 0.26 3.85 
Coal   0.3 3.33 
Coking Coal  0.3 3.33 
Coke   0.37 2.7 
source: DEFRA (2003) 
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Table 11: Conversion Factors 
      
Energy 1 kWh 3.6 MJ 
tce 1 tce 29308 MJ 
1 tce 8.141 MWh 
source: MIT
16
 
 
 
 
Table 12: Calorific Values 
      
Fuel kWh/tonnes Source/Comment 
Coal (weighted average) 7583 DEFRA (2003) 
Fuel Oil 11999 DEFRA (2003) 
Natural gas 14779 DEFRA (2003) and assuming that 
1kg Gas = 53.2 MJ (MIT energy 
conversion sheet) 
 
 
                                                 
16 http://web.mit.edu/mit_energy/programs/discussions/disc_2006_Energy101.html. 
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